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Successful controllers evolve as they are refined, extended, and adapted to new systems
and contexts. This evolution occurs in the controller design and also in its software
implementation. Model-based design and controller synthesis can help to synchronize
this evolution of design and software, but such synchronization is rarely complete as
software tends to also evolve in response to elements rarely present in a control model,
leading to mismatches between the control design and the software.
In this thesis, we perform a first-of-its-kind study on the evolution of two popular
open-source safety-critical autopilot control software – ArduPilot, and Paparazzi, to better
understand how controllers evolve and the space of potential mismatches between control
design and their software implementation. We then use that understanding to prototype
a technique, called mutation tool, that can generate mutated versions of code to mimic
evolution to assess its impact on a controller’s behavior.
We report on three major findings. First, control software evolves quickly and controllers are rewritten in their entirety, many times over through the controller’s lifetime,
which implies that the design, synthesis, and implementation of controllers must support
not just the initial baseline system but also their incremental evolution. Second, many
software changes stem from an inherent mismatch between the continuous time/space
physical model and its corresponding discrete software implementation, but also from the
mishandling of exceptional conditions, and limitations and distinct data representation of
the underlying computing architecture. Third, using our mutation tool that we developed,

we show that small code changes can have a dramatic effect in a controller’s behavior,
which implies that further support is needed to bridge these mismatches as carefully
verified model properties may not necessarily translate to its software implementation.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Successful systems evolve, and so do their controllers. Conceptually, this evolution occurs
at two distinct levels as shown in Figure 1.1. At the control design level, that evolution
may occur on the mathematical representations or higher level models in the chosen
representation (e.g., Simulink, Matlab, Octave). At this level it is common to observe
model changes meant to refine the control law as the logical conditions under which a
system should operate are realized, as the assumptions or levels of abstraction of the
model are refined, or the model is revised to fit another system.

Figure 1.1: Evolution at the design and software implementation levels.
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At the software level of the controller we observe at least three types of changes. First,
software changes that directly map to the same changes in the control design. These
changes constitute the primary target for tools supporting model-based design [61, 35]
or controller synthesis [11]. Second, software changes that are meant to complete pieces
of the implementation that were not defined in the design, either because of the level of
modeling abstraction employed, or because it was not cost-effective to define them at the
design level. Third, changes driven by the need to integrate the software with a larger
software ecosystem that goes beyond the controller itself, or by software maintenance
needs.

1.1

Motivation

In this section, we discuss the need for understanding the controller code evolution and
the need to analyse the impact in safety-critical systems. The frequency of each type
of software change varies significantly across systems. For a selected number of safetycritical software with large development resources, most changes can occur at the design
level and be automatically verified and transfered to code with high fidelity (as shown
by the arrow in Figure 1.1 going from the design model to the partial implementation
of that model in software). For most projects, however, many changes occur just in the
software as the controller design concentrates on the key building blocks providing a
partial model of the system. Furthermore, the design necessarily abstracts many of the
computing elements and context that must then be implemented in software. Sometimes
these software changes make it back to the model through some mechanism like a bug
tracker. Most often, however, implementation changes do not make it back or cannot be
incorporated into the model. This causes a challenging divergence as the implementation
of those abstractions in the software can have significant effects on the performance of the
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control system, potentially invalidating the properties so carefully proven at the design
level.
In spite of the prevalence and potential impact of this evolution, we, as a community,
know very little about how the controllers that we so carefully craft change during
their evolution, particularly at the software level. Our courses on control design, our
textbooks, the tools we use, and the most promising research efforts largely ignore the
evolution of controllers. We are distinctly aware of the inherent mismatches between the
physical and software worlds (e.g., continuous vs. discrete, infinite vs. finite), but lack an
understanding of how those mismatches manifest as the software changes.

1.2

Contributions

In this thesis, we propose processes and tools that would help control engineers to
understand the controller evolution and divergence from a software perspective. It is
particularly relevant to safety-critical systems that explicitly rely on model properties
or implicitly rely on their assumptions. In this work we shed light on this evolution by
performing a first-of-its-kind case study exclusively on control software to show how and
in what way it evolves. To do this we examine 964 commits to 10 controller system files
from ArduPilot and Paparazzi UAV - popular autopilot control software systems used
on a wide range of Unmanned Air Systems (UAS) [2, 55]. First, to provide a baseline for
how much a controller evolves, we report metrics capturing how much controller-related
evolution happens in these controllers. Our results show that controllers system files
changed up to 30 times a year and with enough lines of code changes to rewrite the
original controller over 9 times over their lifetime. Implication. This means as control
software matures it may have little code in common with the original, and as a result,
unless a tight correspondence between model and software is enforced the evolved model
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and control software may diverge drastically. This suggests that techniques such as control
synthesis and model-based design techniques and tools must focus on accommodating
this type of incremental process and evolution.
We then identify 4 categories that capture the evolutionary changes resulting from
inherent mismatches between system models and controllers, and their software implemented counterparts. Our results show that although some changes stem from an
inherent mismatch between the continuous time/space physical model and its corresponding discrete software implementation, the majority of the changes were associated
with handling exceptional conditions, and with the limitations and distinct data representation of the underlying computing architecture. Implication. This points to an
unexplored opportunity for automated synthesis and software development techniques
that can bridge these mismatches appearing during software evolution that may render
carefully verified model properties invalid at the control software level.
Last, we explore the effects of software evolution in the performance of 3 controllers
designed with Simulink. To do that, we leverage static code analysis techniques from the
software engineering discipline. Using this analysis, we created a process that would allow
creation of generic templates to mimic the controller code evolution. Our analysis on 3
Simulink controllers resulted in 21 unique templates to represent the mismatches between
system models and controllers, and their software implemented counterparts. This opens
up opportunities for control engineers to create templates that are specific to their own
controllers code evolution environment. In other words, control engineers can provide
their carefully crafted mathematical model restrictions and expected fault-behavior in
these templates.
In addition to this, we prototyped a tool that understands these templates and
generates versions of the original code with mutated regions reflecting the categorized
changes we observed in ArduPilot and Paparazzi UAV. The tool is written at a compiler
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level that is capable of analyzing C family programming languages (C, C++, Objective
C/C++, OpenCL, CUDA, and RenderScript). It takes as input the controller code (this is
automatically generated by the Simulink toolset from carefully crafted control models)
and can be configured to generate different type and different number of mutated
programs. Executing the mutated programs (it is commonly referred as mutants) and
observing the output results demonstrate how small and typical software changes can
dramatically impact control performance.
We report on three major findings. First, control software evolves quickly and controllers are rewritten in their entirety, many times over through the controller’s lifetime,
which implies that the design, synthesis, and implementation of controllers must support
not just the initial baseline system but also their incremental evolution. Second, many
software changes stem from an inherent mismatch between the continuous time/space
physical model and its corresponding discrete software implementation, but also from the
mishandling of exceptional conditions, and limitations and distinct data representation of
the underlying computing architecture. Third, using our mutation tool that we developed,
we show that small code changes can have a dramatic effect in a controller’s behavior,
which implies that further support is needed to bridge these mismatches as carefully
verified model properties may not necessarily translate to its software implementation. In
summary, our contributions are:
• A novel approach capturing the controller evolution in software, an aspect overlooked by control community.
• Developed four categories to capture controller evolution in software: Precision and
Accuracy, Exception Handling, Time and Space Model, and Resource Attributes.
• Developed a controller-specific mutation tool that mutates code generated from
a model-based control design paradigm. The tool also compares outputs of the
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mutated code to the original to assess the impact of software changes on control
performance.
We also present possible future directions for the work presented in this thesis.

1.3

Innovations

In this thesis, we perform a first-of-its-kind study to understand the evolution of controller
from a software perspective. The study is designed to highlight the mismatches between
the control design and software. We also invent four mismatch categories, explain them
with definition and examples. In addition to this, we make the first attempt to study the
controller impact analysis using the proposed mismatch categories. We achieve this using
our generic templates, mutation tool and step response characteristics. For this purpose,
we created 21 unique template mutators for the three categories: Precision and Accuracy,
Exception Handling, and Time and Space Model. The Resource Attributes category is
excluded due to the tight dependence on specific hardware configurations. Lastly, we
use a new validation technique to analyse the impact of our mutated code using step
response characteristics.
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Chapter 2
Related work

This chapter presents the prior work that is relevant to understand the mismatches
between control design and software. Most work at the intersection of software and
control has examined the impacts of the disparity between the continuous mathematical
models representing physical systems and controllers and the fundamentally discrete
nature of computing [68]. Such research focuses on the effects of computation (e.g.,
quantization, delay) on the controller and seeks to find ways to incorporate them into
controller design [67]. This is the substance of digital control theory [23].

2.1 Software development and control design
The control community does not generally examine the role the software development
process plays in impacting control design. But examining control software and its
evolution could have far reaching impacts. For example, in the process of software
maintenance, a year after the controller design, if a key calculation alters the precision by
changing fabs() to fabsf()1 does this impact system stability? Does a software change
to limit memory stack size, a limitation of the computer architecture, cause a function call
chain to fail, impacting controller performance? A study of control software evolution
1 fabs

operates on type double while fabsf operates on type float
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can provide insight into how these effects could be mitigated either in the control model
or in the software evolution process.
This motivation has led to some work focusing on software and control systems. Feron
has examined how to integrate proofs of important control system properties, such as
stability, directly into software [19]. This can alert the software developer when sensitive
code is being modified, and provide a mechanism for verification processes to assess
correctness. But unless the annotation process is less costly, the sources of unsoundness
controlled, and the tools well integrated into the developer’s environment and workflow,
such strategies will struggle to gain mainstream acceptance [32, 9].
In safety-critical systems, model-based design strategies ideally create a 1:1 correspondence between the model and the software [58, 18, 68]. This strategy has been included
in the most recent revisions of DO-178C “Software Considerations in Airborne Systems
and Equipment Certification” [59] and its supplements [10]. This is done by building
models in Matlab, Simulink, Stateflow, or other tools, verifying these models, and then
autogenerating corresponding code. In this paradigm the code autogeneration tool must
be certified to produce provably correct results. While this strategy links the model and
software it may only exist in domain-specific applications [35], and may not link 3rd -party
software libraries, drivers, or other specialized pieces of code used in development of the
system, or may be incomplete.

2.2 Control software validation and verification
The software engineering community has developed techniques to cope with the validation and verification of systems that includes control software (e.g., [6, 47, 26, 37]), or
their sound application to assist in self-adaptation [22]. Unfortunately, outside of highly
regulated safety-critical systems, development use of these strategies is limited due to
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high costs. This is particularly noticeable in the emerging UAS industry where open
source autopilots (e.g., ArduPilot [2], Paparazzi UAV [55], PX4 [57]) are used extensively
on various types of hardware with contrastingly very light regulations and rigor in design
and test processes.
2.2.1

Software evolution

Software evolution has been an active research topic for decades, and the realization that
successful systems evolve and how it evolves has led to laws of software evolution [41],
and a rich suite of techniques to understand, handle, and support changes associated with
all the entities involved in the software development process [49]. The focus of the study
in this thesis is on analyzing the evolution of control software developed independently
of model-based design[18], synthesis [63], or domain-specific annotations in code [19].
Following established practices [12], we analyzed two bodies of small, open-source,
unregulated, safety-critical control software for which there are hundreds of available code
changes recorded with commit level granularity. We have chosen these bodies of software
for two key reasons. First, a large and increasing portion of critical software development
with wide-reaching impacts is being developed in lightly controlled development and
largely unregulated environments - such as the UAS industry. Second, understanding
how the software evolves and reasoning about where mismatches with the model are
likely to occur can pinpoint areas that future studies and techniques must target.
2.2.2

Mutation testing

Mutation testing introduces faults in a target software and checks if it can find errors.
It is a type of software testing technique used in the verification process of a software.
Existing test cases and data from unaltered software can help to find out errors after
mutation testing introduces faults. Since the invention of mutation testing in 1971 [42], it
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has been applied in different application domains and different programming languages.
In [30], Jia and Harman provides a comprehensive survey on mutation testing. Mutation
testing is a fault-based testing technique, Baker and Habli [4] applied this technique
on safety-critical systems to show that the code coverage is not adequate as a criteria
for DO-178B certification authorities sufficiency testing. DO-178B purpose is ”to provide
guidelines for the production of software for airborne systems and equipment that performs its
intended function with a level of confidence in safety that complies with airworthiness requirements”
[15]. In addition to this, in reference to safety-critical systems, mutation testing is applied
in a civil nuclear software program [13].
Our mutation tool also builds on a large body of work in software engineering, and
more specifically on mutation testing. Mutation testing aims to evaluate the strength
of a test suite in terms of the percentage of code versions with seeded code changes it
can detect. Those versions are called mutants; it is said to be alive or dead based on the
presence of a change detected by the test suite between the output of the original program
and the mutated program. There is a large number of mutation approaches available,
as well as several analyses to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the mutation
process. For more information on the topic we refer the reader to [30]. In our setting, we
utilize mutation as a way to mimic the evolution we observed in ArduPilot and Paparazzi
UAV, and then to assess the impact of those mutations on simple controller operations.
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Chapter 3
Controller evolution: an empirical study

In this chapter, we propose an analysis process to study the software code changes of
a controller. The primary objective of this process is to answer research questions that
help to understand the evolution of controller development. The approach is performed
manually on two popular control software: ArduPilot and Paparazzi UAV.

3.1 Study
The following research questions will provide a foundation for understanding and
characterization of control software evolution, and will underscore future tools that
incorporate this knowledge into a framework for controller development:
RQ1: How does the software implementing a control system evolve? We seek to quantify
the degree and nature of changes in control software in the absence of an explicit control
model.

Figure 3.1: Overview of Study Analysis Process
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Table 3.1: ArduPilot Files Examined
File
libraries/AC PID/AC PID.cpp
libraries/AC AttitudeControl/AC PosControl.cpp
libraries/AC AttitudeControl/AC AttitudeControl.cpp
libraries/AC WPNav/AC WPNav.cpp
libraries/AP Baro/AP Baro.cpp

Type
Controller
Controller & Estimator
Controller & Estimator
Waypoint & Navigation
Sensing

Table 3.2: Paparazzi Files Examined
Controller & Estimator
sw/airborne/firmwares/rotorcraft/stabilization/stabilization attitude eule-Controller & Esr int.c
timator
sw/airborne/firmwares/rotorcraft/stabilization/stabilization rate.c
Controller & Estimator
sw/airborne/firmwares/rotorcraft/guidance/guidance h.c
Waypoint & Navigation
sw/airborne/boards/lisa l/baro board.c
Sensing
sw/airborne/firmwares/fixedwing/stabilization/stabilization attitude.c

RQ2: To what degree can the changes in the control software be captured by a control
model or constitute mismatches between the model and the software? We focus on
characterizing the space of software changes that are rarely part of the control model.
3.1.1

Analysis Artifacts

For the purpose of our empirical study, we required artifacts that included significant
control software systems with many available versions reflecting their evolution.
The first artifact is the popular ArduPilot [2]1 . ArduPilot has over five years of
well maintained history that provides, among other subsystems, a sophisticated control
system for autopilot support that can operate on a variety of vehicles including airplanes,
multirotors, helicopters, and boats. The code is accessible through a git repository
(https://github.com/ArduPilot/ardupilot) that stores the code changes committed by
1 The

ArduPilot website reports that over one million vehicles use this code base, including companies
like 3DR, PrecisionHawk, AgEagle, Insitu Boeing, Kespry, branches of the US military, and NASA among
others.
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the developers since 2010. As of January 2018, the repository includes 347 contributors
that have committed almost 30,000 changes. The latest version of ArduPilot contains
approximately 200k lines of code (LOC)2 in C/C++. We focus our analysis on the
evolution of a handful of ArduPilot files written in the C/C++ programming language
that are part of the core control library. We selected the core control files (see Table 3.1)
that provide coverage of functionality associated with position and attitude control. We
analyzed 585 commits3 , the primary unit of change we consider, where each commit
included changes to at least one of the target files.
The second artifact is Paparazzi UAV [55] which has over 11 years of development
history. Paparazzi UAV provides autopilot capabilities for fixed-wing, rotorcraft, and
a few hybrid vehicles. The code is accessible through a git repository https://github.
com/paparazzi/paparazzi. As of January 2018, the repository includes 97 contributors
and ~15,000 changes. The latest version of Paparazzi UAV contains approximately 190k
LOC in C/C++. We again selected control files (see Table 3.2) central to position and
attitude control and analysed 379 commits.
Table 3.3: Definitions of Categories for Mismatches Between Models and Software
Category

Definition
A software change resulting from features or limitations of

Resource Attributes

the computing architecture, including software and hardware. Such changes are often intended to better fit or utilize
existing resources such as memory, energy, or bandwidth.

2 LOC

- Lines of Code - is a count of lines in the text of source code excluding comment lines [51].
the version control system git, a commit consists of one or more changed files identified as a single
change unit by the developer and assigned a single identification number by git.
3 In
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A software change that modifies a measured value or a
numerical calculation in order to more closely mimic continPrecision and Accuracy

uous mathematics. Such changes often consist of utilizing
improved functions in advanced math libraries or newer
sensor devices, and simply using types with more bits for
representation.
A software change resulting from the intrinsic discrete nature of the computing system in representing time and
space. Such changes often consist of handling the inherent
mismatch between continuous and discrete paradigms in

Time and Space Model

representing and manipulating time in the calculations of
derivatives and integrals, in the manipulation of variables
associated with the vehicle location or motion, or in governing the periodic execution of certain pieces of code (e.g.,
tasks).
A software change resulting from the handling of anomalous conditions that would otherwise result in computa-

Exception Handling

tional failures. Such changes often consist in additional
support for conditions to adhere to either mathematical
laws (e.g., dividing by zero), or computational laws (e.g.,
unexpected input, seg fault, etc.).

Neither ArduPilot nor Paparazzi UAV have formal models of the controller, and as a
result do not practice complete model-based design. These controllers are maintained
and modified primarily in software. This is common practice among small companies,
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researchers, and hobbyists in areas not subject to strict regulation and certification
requirements. Because ArduPilot and Paparazzi UAV provide safety-critical software to
unmanned systems without a rigorous certification/verification process their software is
an excellent example of control software development that may be (at best) weakly linked
to a mathematical model with provable guarantees.
Table 3.4: Examples of Categories for ArduPilot Mismatches Between Models and Software in ArduPilot
Category

Examples
This change stores variables in flash memory
instead of static random access memory.
Commit id : 452749149 f d 4 d 3 e 9 1 0 e 6 e d 2 2 a 6 f 8 6 1 d 5 8 6 2 a 4 b 0
Committers comment : convert AC_PID library to AP_Param

Resource Attributes

...
+ const AP_Param :: GroupInfo AC_PID :: var_info [] PROGMEM ={
+

AP_GROUPINFO (" P " ,

AC_PID , _kp ) ,

+

AP_GROUPINFO (" I " ,

AC_PID , _ki ) ,

+

AP_GROUPINFO (" D " ,

AC_PID , _kd ) ,

...
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Replaces fast atan with atanf to improve
accuracy and precision for calculating the target pitch angle.
Commit id :

,→ 872583 f 4 4 1 2 a d e 1 6 a 3 1 e 8 b 7 b d 0 3 6 3 c 2 9 4 a 2 0 d 3 0 1
Committers

,→ comment : AC_AttitudeControl

Precision and Accuracy

,→ removed fast_atan
...
- _pitch_target = constrain_float ( fast_atan (

,→ - accel_forward /( GRAVITY_MSS * 100) ) *
,→ (18000/ M_PI_F ) ,- lean_angle_max , lean_angle_max ) ;
+ _pitch_target = constrain_float ( atanf (

,→ - accel_ forward /( GRAVITY_MSS * 100) ) *
,→ (18000/ M_PI_F ) ,- lean_angle_max , lean_angle_max ) ;
...

This change alters the time representation
from seconds to milliseconds to more frequently check the position controller activity.
Commit id : 88 e c 1 3 b 1 0 d 9 1 3 d 7 2 c d b 0 b 2 4 b a 2 e 1 2 4 4 e 6 e d 3 7 7 3 4

Time and Space Model

Committers comment : fix build
...
-

if ( dt > P O S C O N T R O L _ A C T I V E _ T I M E O U T _ S E C ) {

+

if ( dt > P O S C O N T R O L _ A C T I V E _ T I M E O U T _ M S *1.0 e -3 f ) {

...
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This change checks whether the input variable
to the PID controller is infinite or undefined
before using it to calculate the PID terms of
the controller.
Commit id : a e 7 7 c 1 8 a 1 9 3 3 d c b 0 0 e b 9 f c 8 3 8 8 7 2 1 1 9 b 2 2 5 0 9 1 5 c

Exception Handling

Committers comment : Input to the PID controller is
protect against NaN and INF .
...
+

// don ’ t pass in inf or NaN

+

if ( isfinite ( input ) ) {

...

3.1.2

Analysis Process

The process is summarized in Figure 3.1 and consists of a set of filtering and analysis
steps for each of the questions. The process to answer RQ1 starts by systematically
querying the git repositories to quantify the degree of change on the target files in terms
of size, frequency, and people involved. To do this we downloaded the latest repositories
and developed a set of scripts, in combination with the git client management tool Giteye,
to collect the data.
To better understand the nature of the changes we also devised a procedure to
identify commits that are most likely associated with changes that will impact the
control system. This procedure focused on the developers’ comments and code changes,
and was partially automated through a syntactic file search using common control
keywords (e.g., control, derivative, error, feedforward, filter, frame, frequency, gain,
integral, kalman, proportional) and also keywords specific to the target autopilot controller
(e.g., acceleration, altitude, distance, pitch, roll, yaw, waypoint, speed, velocity). This
process also took into consideration the online documentation explaining the roles of key
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configurable parameters and variable naming practices.
Table 3.5: Examples of Categories for Paparazzi UAV Mismatches Between Models and
Software in Paparazzi UAV
Category

Examples
The horizontal feedforward gain is defined
as 0. This is later used for multiplication bit
operation to determine the control command
for horizontal guidance navigation. Bit representations of control variables cannot be
represented in the control model.
Commit id : 5 d e 5 1 d 3 5 5 8 8 f a 0 0 8 0 d b 7 b 8 4 1 6 9 2 4 a 9 0 0 b 4 0 5 b 4 e 9
Committers comment : [ guidance ] fix IGAIN precision and
add VGAIN

Resource Attributes

based on #682 this may introduce too large

horizontal guidance IGAIN in rotorcraft airframe files
...
+ # ifndef GUIDANCE_H_VGAIN
+ # define GUIDANCE_H_VGAIN 0
+ # endif
...
guidance_h_cmd_earth . x = pd_x +
(( guidance_h_vgain * guidance_h_speed_ref . x ) >> 17) +
(( guidance_h_again * guidance_h_accel_ref . x ) >> 8) ;
...
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Replaces int32 with float to improve accuracy and precision for calculating the angular
rate set point.
Commit id : 0 c 9 5 b 9 e 2 6 e d a b a 0 8 5 f 2 1 0 b 4 1 d 0 a 8 3 2 5 b 6 0 7 d 9 a d a

Precision and Accuracy

Committers comment : [ rotorcraft ] converted PI rate
controller to floating point

closes #1624

...
- struct Int32Rates sta bili zatio n_ra te_sp ;
+ struct FloatRates sta bili zatio n_ra te_sp ;
...

This change alters the execution frequency of
the navigation task from 10 Hz to 16 Hz.
Commit id : 624 c e 9 e e a 9 2 3 b f f 5 5 e 3 c 9 1 3 3 6 3 e 9 b 4 2 f e 9 c d 6 a a b
Committers comment : navigation function in guidance ;

Time and Space Model

frequency set at 16 Hz
...
-

RunOnceEvery (50 , na v_ pe rio di c_ tas k_ 10 Hz () ) ;

+

RunOnceEvery (32 , nav_periodic_task () ) ;

...
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This change prevents a divide by zero error
by ensuring the variable is greater than zero
before being used to calculate the navigation
ratio for the vehicle controller.
Commit id :

,→ 7 f 9 1 e f a 2 8 5 4 f e e 7 0 2 a 6 6 0 1 2 5 6 d e a 5 f f 1 9 5 e 5 8 f 8 0
Committers comment : Fixed Error

,→ preventing AGR climb
from working .

Exception Handling

Navigation would

,→ not blend .
...
+ if ( AGR_BLEND_START > AGR_BLEND_END &&

,→ AGR_BLEND_END > 0) {
...
+ nav_ratio = AGR_CLIMB_NAV_RATIO + ( 1 -

,→ AGR_CLIMB_NAV_RATIO ) *(1 ,→ ( fabs ( altitude_error ) - GR_BLEND_END ) /
,→ ( AGR_BLEND_START - AGR_BLEND_END ) ) ;
...

The resulting commits (489 for ArduPilot and 275 for Paparazzi UAV) were further
analyzed to discriminate between changes deemed semantically equivalent such as those
caused by documentation, refactoring, or abstraction meant to ease the maintenance of
the software without directly impacting the functionality. For example, code found to be
repeated may be extracted into a function call. This, theoretically, has no impact on the
controller as it is purely a software maintenance change. This filtering left 396 ArduPilot
and 154 Paparazzi UAV commits/changes impacting the controller directly.
The process to answer RQ2 (see Figure 3.1) filtered the remaining commits by making
a qualitative analysis to determine whether the change could have been handled in a
typical control model. Again we note that neither ArduPilot nor Paparazzi UAV have

21
formal control models, so our assessment consists of a conservative judgement of whether,
if a mathematical model of the control system would be available, such a model could
accommodate a given change. It is conservative in that, when in doubt, we assume
that a control model could handle such a change. More specifically, unless the changes
that are: 1) tightly associated with the computing architecture, 2) the representations
of data in that architecture, 3) the discretization of time and space to function in that
architecture, or 4) the handling of anomalies due to that software functions, we assume it
could be represented in a control model. When we determine that a control model would
not typically include such a change because it is tightly associated with the computing
software context, we assume it constitutes a mismatch between model and code that
could have an impact on the system behavior. We then proceed to classify each change
into one of four categories that emerged as we analyzed these mismatches and grouped
them according to their characteristics, defined in Table 3.3 and examples are provided in
Table 3.4 & 3.5. This classification procedure was costly, with some changes requiring
minutes and others requiring hours and the participation of all authors. Furthermore,
this classification process was iterative as new mismatches emerged that either did not fit
existing categories or fit multiple ones.
3.1.3

Threats to validity

This study has shortcomings that may impact the validity of the findings. First, the
scope of the study is limited to the software side of controller evolution. This choice was
intentional and allowed us to quickly leverage readily available data while decoupling
the evolution occuring in software from that which would occur in a model. This is the
first step in this line of work, and studies of controller design evolution, controller design
coupled with control software, and impact on system performance will provide a broader
understanding of the topic.
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Second, our study is focused on a subset of files of two control software systems. This
choice was opportunistic in that Ardupilot and Paparazzi have been widely deployed,
so findings in these code bases can still be valid for similar systems (e.g., LibrePilot [56],
PX4 [57]). Likewise, even though the cost of analyzing hundreds of commits limited us
to study ten files, those files perform different controller tasks and were designed by
different groups of developers. As a result, we anticipate these findings will also apply
to other files designed by other developers. We also ackowledge that the granularity of
change we studied, commits, may not expose all code changes made by developers.
Third, our analysis had a quantitative aspect that is partially automated and higly
reproducible, and a qualitative aspect that in many instances required us to make
judgement calls. Such judgement calls are subject to many biases, which we tried to
reduce by defining clear criteria for filtering and classification, by having multiple authors
check different parts of the results, and by iterating and revisiting the results as anomalies
emerged. We have prepared a package with the detailed data for others to review our
choices4 .

3.2 Results
We now present the results for our study, answering RQ1 and RQ2 described in Section 3.1.
3.2.1

Answers to RQ1 - How Much do Controllers Evolve?

We quantify the evolution of the selected ArduPilot and Paparazzi UAV control files in
Table 3.1. Results are captured in Table 3.6 & 3.7 showing the evolution of the software.
It reports on initial and final LOC, # of commits, LOC changed, and people involved for
4 https://nimbus.unl.edu/CE/controllerevolution.html
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Date of earliest commit
Date
of
the
latest
commit
LOC in the
earliest commit
LOC
in
the
latest
commit
Commits involving that
file
LOC
changed
in
those
commits
code churn
People
involved
Growth (%)
Rewrite Rate

AP Baro.cpp

AC WPNav.cpp

AC AttitudeControl.cpp

AC PID.cpp

Filename(→)

AC PosControl.cpp

Table 3.6: Overview of ArduPilot Control Software Evolution

Total

1/28/2012

2/14/2014

2/14/2014

4/13/2013

6/27/2012

2/18/2017

4/27/2017

6/22/2017

7/9/2017

7/7/2017

54

601

152

166

55

1028

141

661

440

754

382

2378

37

134

127

185

102

585

463

1672

3350

3252

1043

9780

6

3

3

4

6

8

161.11
8.57

9.98
2.78

189.47
22.04

354.22
19.59

594.55
18.96

131.32
9.51

each of the files of interest. Changes to these key files were made by 28 developers who
changed 15,066 LOC over 964 commits throughout the lifetime of the files. The guiding
principle in this analysis is to examine the evolution of control software, and as a result,
throughout the presented results we focus on changes to the software which excludes the
first commit representing the initial implementation.
The metric in row 8 of Table 3.6 & 3.7 assesses how much the software grows over
its lifetime. Growth is computed as

( X −Y )
Y %

where X is the number of lines of code,

excluding comments, in the latest commit (row 4 in Table 3.6 & 3.7) and Y is the number
of lines of code (excluding comments) in the earliest commit (row 3 in Table 3.6 & 3.7).
Growth captures the net lines of code changed including changes stemming from model
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Date of earliest commit
Date
of
the
latest
commit
LOC in the
earliest commit
LOC
in
the
latest
commit
Commits involving that
file
LOC
changed
in
those
commits
code churn
People
involved
Growth (%)
Rewrite Rate

baro board.c

guidanceh.c

stabilization rate.c

stabilization attitude euler int.c

Filename(→)

stabilization attitude.c

Table 3.7: Overview of Paparazzi UAV Control Software Evolution

Total

10/19/06

07/26/09

02/10/09

02/10/09

08/21/10

02/19/17

03/22/16

04/27/16

12/23/17

12/27/17

135

89

36

126

77

463

323

195

150

546

168

1382

72

52

60

159

36

379

707

636

757

2859

327

5286

10

5

5

12

5

20

139.26
5.24

119.1
7.15

316.67
21.03

333.33
22.69

118.18
4.25

198.49
11.42

clarifications, new features, bug fixes, and software maintenance. As an example for
this metric, AC PID.cpp had 54 lines of code initially, and in the latest commit has 141
lines of code, a growth of 161%. The ArduPilot files have an average growth rate of
131% while the Paparazzi UAV files average growth rate is 198%, implying that the initial
implementations required significant changes to complete them and refine them, and
more generally that these control files, like any successful software, grow in complexity as
they evolve. In some cases, like for AP Baro.cpp, we notice a dramatic growth of almost
~600% to abstract common features, support more devices, and improve calibration.
Other files like AC PosControl.cpp exhibit a more stable development from the start with
only ~10% growth.
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Growth does not, however, capture the amount of change occurring in a file. To
measure this, code churn is defined as the total number of lines of code changed (row
6 in Table 3.6 & 3.7) [24]. For example, the code churn for AC AttitudeControl.cpp is 3350 lines of code with an average of over 26 lines changed per each of its 127
commits. To further emphasize the seriousness of code churn for control software we
use a metric we call “Rewrite Rate” that captures how many times the original controller
has been essentially rewritten from a software perspective. We use

Z
Y,

where Z is the

total number of LOC changed in row 6 in Table 3.6 & 3.7. However, high growth
does not necessarily mean high churn. AP Baro.cpp, for example, exhibits the highest
growth of all files, but AC AttitudeControl.cpp shows the highest code churn. Of the
ten files, five have Rewrite Rates ~20 indicating those control files have almost nothing
in common with the original versions. To give perspective, even the file with the lowest
rate, AC PosControl.cpp, has been rewritten almost three times.
For software engineers this evolution is not necessarily surprising as it mimics what is
seen in other evolving system files. For control designers, however, this implies that a
controller implemented in software may significantly diverge from the original design
without a correspondence to the model unless those ties are continuously enforced. It
also means that if a tight correspondence between the model and software is not enforced,
a large amount of time must be spent updating the controller to correspond with the
software (dashed arrow in Figure 1.1) or most likely the model will become obsolete
along with its proven guarantees.
Finally, we observed a high concentration of changes in a smaller group of files.
Two thirds of the code churn in ArduPilot occur in two files, and a similar change
concentration is found in a single Paparazzi UAV file. We conjecture that files like
AC PID.cpp containing some key abstractions may “settle” into a steady state as other
software modules come to depend on core functionality. Such functionality with higher
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AP Baro.cpp

AC WPNav.cpp

AC AttitudeControl.cpp

AC PID.cpp

Category(↓) / Filename (→)

AC PosControl.cpp

Table 3.8: Classification Results of ArduPilot Mismatches Between Models and Software

Total

Resource Attributes
Precision and Accuracy
Time and Space Model
Exception Handling

1
7
2
4

2
15
15
6

0
7
3
2

1
13
11
12

0
9
8
5

4
49
37
29

Total Commits With Mismatches

12

29

11

32

18

102

baro board.c

guidanceh.c

stabilization rate.c

stabilization attitude euler int.c

Category(↓) / Filename (→)

stabilization attitude.c

Table 3.9: Classification Results of Paparazzi UAV Mismatches Between Models and
Software

Total

Resource Attributes
Precision and Accuracy
Time and Space Model
Exception Handling

0
0
0
1

0
1
0
1

0
2
0
0

3
5
1
5

0
0
1
0

3
8
2
7

Total Commits With Mismatches

1

2

2

11

1

17

stability may constitute more cost-effective targets for modeling and verifying more
extensively at design time, before transferring them into software.
3.2.2

Answers to RQ2 - What Evolution Results from Model and Software Mismatches?

If control models and software evolve independently then it is critical to understand
what kind of changes prevent a 1:1 correspondence between them. We classified the 102
ArduPilot commits and the 17 Paparazzi UAV commits from the last stage of Figure 3.1
into the four categories defined in Table 3.3. These categories represent the primary
mismatches resulting from the incongruences between control models of the physical
system and the computational paradigm of software implementation. In the right hand
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column are examples to clarify the types of changes in these categories.
The mismatched commits and classifications are tallied in Table 3.8 & 3.9. Each
commit could have an arbitrary number of LOC changed, and hence a single commit may
have multiple mismatches and be classified into more than one category.
Overall, the distribution of mismatches is similar across ArduPilot and Paparazzi
UAV (see “Total” columns in Table 3.8 & 3.9) However, the number of mismatches in
ArduPilot is five times larger than Paparazzi UAV despite having smaller growth, rewrite
rate, and fewer developers involved (from Table 3.6 & 3.7). This is due, in part, to the
larger number of commits that affect the control model in ArduPilot. Further explanations
may be that, in Paparazzi UAV, some control elements were externalized into a separate
configuration file to isolate potential changes to the system. The analysis of such files are
left for future work.
We also observe that the number of mismatches per file is correlated with code churn
exhibited by the file, with AC AttitudeControl.cpp and guidance h.c being the most
affected. Still, AC AttitudeControl.cpp seems to be the exception, suggesting that other
software engineering factors (e.g., abstractions, refactoring) likely contributed to the
evolution changes for AC AttitudeControl.cpp. Generally, however, mismatch changes
tracks proportionally with total number of changes.
A comparison between AC AttitudeControl.cpp and AC WPNav.cpp in ArduPilot reveals that despite having roughly similar starting code size and total LOC changed in their
lifetime, AC AttitudeControl.cpp has only 30% as many mismatch changes. AC PosControl.cpp and AC WPNav.cpp have similar mismatch changes even though AC WPNav.cpp
was initially much smaller but grew to be twice as large and have much higher code
churn. This is not surprising as AC WPNav.cpp is the navigation code library that calculates
the desired velocity, and acceleration to reach the destination. When the user provides
the destination origin, AC WPNav.cpp creates a flight path using spline waypoints and
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ensures the vehicle operates within the set range of acceleration, velocity, and speed. It
also determines whether the vehicle has reached its target to within a certain radius.
Such a software module is critical and difficult to develop correctly due in part to the
many calculations requiring many vehicle and environmental parameters. Supporting
this conclusion is a similar observation for guidance h.c in Paparazzi UAV given its high
relative mismatches, churn, and growth compared with other Paparazzi UAV files. This
is perhaps the apex of joint model and software integration.
Observing the categories, “Precision & Accuracy” was the biggest source of mismatches between model and software (see “Total” column in Table 3.8 & 3.9), accounting
for 48% of the ArduPilot and 47% of the Paparazzi UAV mismatches. This implies developers prioritized improvements to the precision and accuracy of calculations to either
1) more closely mimic continuous mathematical assumptions of infinite precision, or, 2)
prioritize improvement in computational system performance while sacrifing precision
and accuracy. We observe that some of these changes were not particulary complex
(changing an int to float), while others involved utilizing special functions from a math
software library. Still others, like switching fabs to fabsf, seem to sacrifice precision presumably to be consistent in the use of float to represent decimals and avoid unnecessary
conversions potentially saving unnecessary computations at runtime. These mismatches
were pervasive throughout the evolution of all files.
“Time and Space Model” mismatches are concerned with accounting for and tracking
discrete time in control software. While we considered discretized space in the same
category, which would be more prominent in control software incorporating, for example,
a computer vision component, we did not observe any discretized space mismatches
in this set of files. Ensuring consistency between periodic execution of a controller
and associated computation of discrete derivative and integral equivalents is critical for
correct control performance. We observed many changes that focused on improving this
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consistency in a programming language (C/C++) that does not natively provide semantic
support for timing [39]. Most of these mismatches occur in the navigation/guidance
(AC WPNav.cpp and guidance h.c), and position controller (AC PosControl.cpp) portions
of the controller software. Our results reporting on the number of changes involving
timing provide further support for Lee’s claims that timing in computation is a major
obstacle to the development of combined cyber-physical models in which determinism
is preserved [39]. Although many of these mismatches could be incorporated into the
model by using Matlab toolboxes such as “TrueTime” [25] or checked using other
timing verification strategies like UPPAAL [38], these are often costly and continue to be
underutilized in many development environments like the one we have studied.
Often overlooked by control designers are the undefined mathematical operations
in engineered systems such as dividing by zero, or multiplying by ∞. In mathematical
models these exceptions are built into the assumptions of continuous mathematics and
are implicitly avoided. In software they must be explicitly avoided with lines of code
protecting potentially undefined operations from causing the program to end prematurely
or perform incorrectly. This exception handling also extends to software and computing
architectural rules that must be obeyed (e.g., handling NULL pointers). The combined 36
total mismatches in this category (row 4 of Table 3.8 & 3.9) suggest that even software
developers may take implicit assumptions about exception handling for granted. As the
code evolves these exceptions are dealt with possibly in response to failed test cases or
bug reports.
Finally, computing architectural issues result in some mismatches we classified as
“Resource Attribute.” Modern programming language abstractions have helped reduce
these mismatches as compilers and libraries allow flexibility and optimizations without
special programmer knowledge, and operating systems provide virtual memory and
thread handling for executing processes. The small number of mismatches in this category
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(row 1 of Table 3.8 & 3.9) is likely a result of the non-specialized hardware platform that
ArduPilot and Paparazzi UAV run on. Had the control software required a specialized
Digital Signal Processing (DSP) chip, or Graphical Processing Unit (GPU) we would have
expected to see more mismatches in this category to accommodate those special-purpose
computing architectures. Nevertheless, this category represents an important side-effect
of software implementations of controllers - unless the control model explicitly captures
the details of each target hardware architecture, programming language, 3rd -party library
or hardware driver, and operating system there will likely be mismatches between the
model and implementation.

3.3 Conclusions
In this chapter, we studied and presented the controller evolution, through 964 commits
with 15,066 control software lines changed, of two dominant open-source control software
suites, ArduPilot and Paparazzi UAV. We found that control software evolves quickly;
we observed an average growth of 131% in ArduPilot files and 198% in Paparazzi UAV
files. We also found that amount of change occurring in a file through code churn metric,
half of the files have rewrite rates of ~20 indicating control files have almost nothing in
common with original versions.
In addition to this, we categorized the controller evolution into four categories. These
categories represent the incongruences between control models of the physical system
and the computational paradigm of software implementation. The evolution in terms of
these categories revealed that ”Precision and Accuracy” category was the biggest source
of mismatches. ”Time and Space Model” had the next highest source of mismatches
”Exception Handling” category followed it. These are categories that are often underuti-
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lized or overlooked. ”Resource Attribute” category represented very few but significant
changes that deals with computing architectural mismatch issues.

32

Chapter 4
Impact of Software Changes on Control Performance

In this chapter, we introduce a tool developed to help mimic and analyze the software
controller evolution and its impacts. For this purpose, we designed a tool based on
mutation testing. We first define the process of mutation testing, then explain the
architecture of our proposed mutation tool followed by the methodology, and discuss the
divergence result impacting the controller performance.

4.1 Mutation testing process
Mutation of software is a practice used in the software engineering community to test the
robustness of software and tests to small, isolated changes in the software [30]. Figure 4.1
illustrates the genericprocess ofmutation analysis, in the context ofcontroller software.
In mutation analysis, from an original source program C (in our case, it is the software
program of a controller), an altered program M called mutant is generated by altering
the code. For example, consider a software system that has a line of code performing
an arithmetic operation, a change could involve altering an addition operation of two
variables into a subtraction operation of two variables. Here, the original program is
performing the addition operation whereas the mutated program is performing the
subtraction operation.
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In the next step, we design a test oracle, the dashed rectangle represents this in Figure
4.1. A test oracle is a mechanism that would execute a test on the program to determine
if they pass or fail the test. Following our example of an arithmetic operation, an oracle
would provide two numerical numbers to both the programs, original and mutant. To
check if they pass or fail the test, the oracle has to compare the output values from the
original program and the mutated program. If the values are same, then it passes the test
otherwise failed.

Figure 4.1: Mutation testing process overview.
Lastly, we call a mutant as live if it passes the oracle’s output comparison test otherwise
we call the mutant as dead. This process is repeated for all the mutants generated. The
test oracle usually comprises a set of test cases such that it will test all the components
of a software, in our case, the test oracle tests the behavior of the program using step
response characteristics.
In traditional mutation testing [30], a live mutant is one in which the test oracle
successfully did not catch a difference in the output. A dead mutant or a mutant is said to
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be killed if the test oracle was able to detect a difference in the output. In this scenario, a
dead mutant implies the test case is sufficient to catch errors or vulnerabilities. A perfect
test suite will kill all mutants. A live mutant indicates the test was insufficient to catch
the errors. We adopt this convention with the exception that we assume our test suite
is ideal, and hence ‘live’ mutants (i.e., output of mutated code is equivalent to original
code) are desirable as they imply that the controller is robust to software changes. ‘Dead’
mutants, in our scenario, suggest the controller was vulnerable to small software changes
since the output of the mutated control code was different than the original.

4.2 Mutation tool overview
The proposed mutation tool, an overview of which is in Figure 4.2, generates code from
Simulink models, mutates the code, compiles it, executes a test suite, and compares the
output to the output of the original design. In the Figure 4.2, the dotted line represents
our contribution, it comprises software functionality developed for this thesis. The first
step is to compile and execute a Simulink model to get the output, this we will refer
as original output. Next, we generate C code from the same model and make very few
changes in this C code. This is called the mutated code. We repeat this process with
different changes each in different locations of the C code to get different versions of
mutated code. Lastly, each mutated code is executed to get output that is compared with
the original output.
Our test suite for each mutant is a step response characterized by key control design
quantities. The tool mutates the generated code according to our categories shown in
Table 3.3. We are primarily concerned with studying the mismatches that occur between
control models and control software. As a result, the tool is focused on mutating code
generated from Simulink because: i) model-based design is an increasingly important,
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but relatively little studied methodology, and ii) model-based design should maintain a
1:1 correspondence between the design and generated code, but many changes that could
be made in the code may not be represented in the design.

Figure 4.2: Mutation Tool Architecture.
The mutation tool can understand C family programming languages. It uses the
abstract syntax tree (AST) [50] of the respective programming language to construct a
tree model of the source code. AST captures the abstract syntactic structure (i.e., abstract
syntax consists of a structure of data) of source code, in a tree representation, written in a
software programming language. For example, consider an if-condition-then statement
from a source code, the syntactic construct will be represented as a single node with three
branches in the tree model. We use Clang 3.8.2 and LLVM 4.0 for this purpose and use
the MatchFinder class of Clang to process the AST. To support repeatability, we have built
this software infrastructure inside a operating-system-level virtualization, called docker
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(version 1.13.1).
To study the effects of the mutated software code, we used three different, increasingly
complex system design models developed in Simulink - an automotive cruise control, a
helicopter, and a Boeing 747. The automotive cruise controller contains 14 Matlab blocks,
is publicly provided and made available by the University of Michigan, Carnegie Mellon
University and University of Detroit Mercy [52]. The helicopter system contains 40 blocks,
and is provided by Matlab [45]. It simulates hovering conditions of a helicopter model.
The third system is an airspeed and altitude controller for a Boeing 747 containing 465
blocks. This model is maintained by Michael S. Selig, Rob Deters, and Glen Dimock at
the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign [8].

4.3 Methodolgy
In this section, we discuss the methodology to create the software mutation tool using the
knowledge from our previous study and the knowledge of control theory. The mutation
tool has three phases and the implementation details are depicted in Figure 4.2.
4.3.1

Phase I

In the first phase, C code is generated from the Simulink model and an AST is generated
from the code. The AST is parsed to identify the locations where the code could be
mutated. Mutation templates, software abstractions of our mismatch categories in Table
3.3, are used to identify where code can be mutated. The templates are constructed such
that many locations in the code can be mutated by a single template in a variety of ways.
The tool randomly chooses a location and applies the mutation.
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4.3.1.1

Template creation

Template creation is a manual process to create generic abstractions from code changes.
The goal is to create generic templates that could inject code changes in any software
control system. A template could inject more than one similar code variations in more
than one code location. For example template d*→ d.0f, will make code changes of
2→ 2.0f and also 100→ 100.0f that is present in different code locations. For each of these
code change we can then observe the impact on the controller performance. In our case,
we create generic templates, for the purpose of application we the Matlab environment.
For creating the templates, we first identified the top most changes in each category.
Some software code changes occurred very frequently and was repeated across files,
while some other code changes were less frequent. So in our template creation process,
we first tried to capture this high frequency changes. After gathering these changes,
we wanted to create templates that are generic. For abstracting out these changes we
grouped similar code changes and started creating template for them. We list these
top changes and abstractions that are grouped by similarity for Precision and Accuracy,
Exception Handling, and Time and Space in table 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 respectively. This process
worked well for three categories: Precision and Accuracy, Exception Handling, and Time
and Space Model.
This process did not construct templates for Resource Attributes category because
the software code changes were specific to hardware dependencies. For example, the
software evolutionary code changes with a tightly coupled microprocessor configuration
capabilities like processing power (8-bit or 16-bit) and memory access was a difficult
challenge while constructing templates. To reproduce this in Matlab, Matlab provides
an option to run the Simulink with different hardware specific platforms. We identified
the resource attribute blocks manually. We used the Matlab option to generate C code

38
Before code change
hal.scheduler ->millis ()
AP Math::is zero( filt hz)
!is zero( ki)

After code change
#include<AP Math.h >
AP HAL:: millis ()
is zero ( filt hz )
! AP Math :: is zero ( ki )

Number of occurrences
4
3
3
3

0
200
2

0.0f
0.2f
2.0f

6
2
2

fabs
abs

fabsf
fabs

4
1

Int32 t
int16 t

float
float

3
2

atan2
atan2f
fast atan2
fast atan

atan2f
fast atan2
atan2f
atanf

1
1
1
1

Table 4.1: 5 top most changes from Precision and Accuracy category grouped by similarity

Before code change

isfinite
is zero
is zero
remove <=0.0f
if ( track length == 0.0f)

After code change
Added !is zero condition in IF

Number of occurrences
3

accel z cms <= 0.0f
wp accel cms <= 0

3
2

isnan
isinf

2
2

!isfinite
isnan
isinf

1
1
1
2
1

Table 4.2: 5 top most changes from Exception Handling category grouped by similarity
for 32 bit and 64 bits systems. The resulted code was very similar to each other and
hence we could not create Resource Attributes category templates. We are working towards
getting these things done as future work. In total, we have implemented 21 unique
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Before code change

After code change
uint32 t now =
hal.scheduler->millis();
void AC PosControl::set dt xy
(float dt xy)

dt >= 1.0
dt >= 1.0
if (fabsf( alt offset alt offset active) >0.1f) {

dt >= 1.0f
dt >= 0.2f
if (fabsf( alt offset alt offset active) >0.01f) {

POSCONTROL ACTIVE TIMEOUT MS

POSCONTROL ACTIVE TIMEOUT MS*1.0e3f

float dt = (now last update xy ms)
/ 1000.0f;

float dt = (now last update xy ms)
* 0.001f;

Number of occurrences
11
5
1
1
1

1

1

Table 4.3: 5 top most changes from Time and Space Model category grouped by similarity

template mutators for the three categories: Precision and Accuracy, Exception Handling,
and Time and Space Model as given in Table 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 respectively. The Resource
Attributes category in Table 3.3 is excluded due to the tight dependence on specific
hardware configurations.
4.3.2

Phase II

In the second phase the tool compiles and executes the mutated code to obtain a step input
response from the mutated code to compare against the original model. We quantify the
control performance via 8 traditional control step response quantities: rise time, settling
time, settling min, settling max, overshoot, undershoot, peak, and peak time [54]. For
compilation process, the tool requires us to make two configuration settings. First, the tool
needs to understand the software environment and software dependencies. It requires
this because the compiler requires this information to generate abstract syntax tree for the
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targeted software code. Second, modify the control input values in your control software.
The tool compiles and executes the target control software assuming that the control
input values are changed, as needed my the user. Currently, the tool lacks a placeholder
to mention the location of control input value present in the software code, this will be
incorporated in the future.
4.3.2.1

Matlab specific mutation

For the purpose of generating mutants, in the third category - Time and Space Model, we
had to improvise our process. Reason being, they involved software code changes with
time and space related variables specific to ArduPilot and Paparazzi UAV. To identify
the variable types and names related with time and space in Matlab environment, we
gathered all the time and space related blocks from Matlab library manually. It is
important to note here that this can be replicated for any other libraries or any other
platforms, in our case this could be used in C and C++ programming languages. Also
our tool has this information in separate configuration file that the user can easily modify
this properties without even changing the code.
We constructed a basic Simulink model environment for these blocks and then generated C code for each of the models separately. Some models did not successfully get
executed due to the requirement and dependency on other blocks, while most others got
successfully executed and generate C code from them. We then use this information to
identify time related variables for Matlab generated C code, automatically. We automated this process with the help of cppchecker [43]. The cppchecker is a static analysis
tool that helps to identify all the variables from the C code. We list these variables for
all the identified Simulink model and hand pick those that are present in more than
one models. This way we ensured that they do not bias the variable names. We then
used these data types and names to come up with templates for mutating in Matlab
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environment.
4.3.3

Phase III

Finally, in the third phase we verify our results. For this purpose, we check whether the
mutated code is stable, unstable, or has altered performance. The tool uses a comparison
mechanism to check the step response characteristics value of the mutants with the
original system. It is important to note here that each system has a different control input
parameter: cruise control system has speed, helicopter system have pitch angle and roll
angle, and Boeing 747 system have airspeed and altitude. In turn, each of these control
input has different step values consisting of numerical quantity and a physical unit. Our
verification process took these things into account and computed the absolute difference
of 8 traditional control step response quantities between the mutated code and original
system. Based on this difference, we classify the mutated code as stable, unstable, or has
altered performance.
Table 4.4: Mutation output details for Precision and Accuracy category in all three systems
Mutation Operator

int T → uint32 T
int T → real T
uint32 T → int T
real T → int T
d* → d*.0f
d* → d*.0
d*.0f or d*.0 → d*
float F() → (double) F()
double F() → (float) F()

Cruise control
# mu#
# exetants
com- cuted
piled
2
2
2
2
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
75
74
74
75
74
74
85
85
84
0
0
0
0
0
0

Helicopter
#
# execom- cuted
piled
6
6
6
6
1
1
0
0
0
3
3
3
109
108
108
109
108
108
125
125
124
0
0
0
0
0
0

# mutants

# mutants
3
3
3
46
263
263
144
0
37

Boeing 747
#
# execom- cuted
piled
3
3
0
0
3
3
46
46
258
258
258
258
144
142
0
0
37
37
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Table 4.5: Mutation output details for Exception handling category in all three systems
Mutation Operator

if(rtIsNaN(X)) → if(!rtIsNaN(X))
if(rtIsInf(X)) → if(!rtIsInf(X))
if(!rtIsNaN(X)) → if(rtIsNaN(X))
if(!rtIsInf(X)) → if(rtIsInf(X))
insert if statment - check divide by 0
remove if statment - check divide by 0
miultiply denominator by zero

Cruise control
Helicopter
Boeing 747
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
mu- com- exe- mu- com- exe- mu- com- exetants piled cuted tants piled cuted tants piled cuted
0
0
0
3
3
2
3
3
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
2
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
18
16
16
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
24
24
24
24
24
24
31
31
31

Table 4.6: Mutation output details for Time and Space Model category in all three systems
Mutation Operator

datatype of time is multiplied by 1000
datatype of time in ifstmt() is negated
variable of time is multiplied by 1000
variable of time in ifstmt() is negated
time and space variables

Cruise control
Helicopter
Boeing 747
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
mu- com- exe- mu- com- exe- mu- com- exetants piled cuted tants piled cuted tants piled cuted
6
5
5
18
17
17
20
17
17
4
4
3
4
4
3
0
0
0
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
7
7
7
10
10
10
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Table 4.7: Summary of the mutation output details for all three systems
Mutation Operator

Cruise control
Helicopter
Boeing 747
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
mu- com- exe- mu- com- exe- mu- com- exetants piled cuted tants piled cuted tants piled cuted

Total 283
279
277
416
408
406
840
Number of lines in file
279
449
Number of unique mutated locations*
84
193
Total mutation coverage
30.10%
42.98%
*Unique mutated location is the number of lines that got changed by the mutation tool.

822

820
1290
435
33.72%

4.4 Results
We generated a total of 1539 mutations from the three different control models. Table 4.4,
4.5, 4.6, and 4.7 provides details on the number of mutants, the number compiled, and
the number executed for each system. The tool covered a considerable percentage of the
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Table 4.8: Summary of mutation results for all three systems
System name

Step input
parameter
name

Step input
values

Most
impacted
step
response
characteristics

% Live
mutants at
10%
threshold

% Dead
mutants at
10%
threshold

Cruise control

Cruise speed
(mph)

0-10

PeakTime

0

100

Pitch angle
(deg)
Roll angle
(deg)

0-1

SettlingMin

0

100

0-1

SettlingMin

0

100

Altitude (m)
Airspeed
(mps)

61 - 62
150.148 151.148

RiseTime
RiseTime

95.37
0

4.63
100

Helicopter

Boeing 747

code, altering more than one-third of the code in each of the systems. Compilation errors
were the result of rare syntax mismatches. Occasionally, a mutant would fail to execute
due to a runtime error. For example, one of the errors was due to altering a timing
value (the mutation changed a timing variable value to 0, as a result the program was
waiting indefinitely) and the other was due to a change in random number generation
(the mutation resulted in a code change seeding the random value to zero, causing the
program to run in a loop indefinitely to find a valid number). Overall, 1503 mutants out
of the 1539 mutations were successfully compiled and executed. This demonstrates the
strength and robustness of our mutation tool.
4.4.1

Analysis I

To analyze the impact of our mutated code, we designed an oracle to classify the results
as either “live” or “dead”. To better understand how a normal mutation tool works,
we refer the reader to [53]. Mutation testing is a check on the robustness of a software
test suite. It does this by mutating software and comparing the output of mutated and
original software. If changes are detected the test suite is robust, otherwise it should
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be improved. Our use of mutation testing differs slightly as we assume an ideal test
suite that will catch all errors, and are therefore interested in assessing the control code’s
robustness to small changes. As a result, ‘live’ mutants are desirable as they indicate
there was no difference in outputs of mutated and original control code. ‘Dead’ mutants
are undesirable as they indicate control code was vulnerable to small software changes.
The oracle has two criteria: one is the threshold value and the other is the number
of step response quantitites. In our case, we use the 8 step response quantities from the
system, we classify a system as “live” if all 8 step response quantities have an output
value within a certain percent of the original design. If not, the mutant is considered
“dead.” We varied this threshold between 0% to 100% to capture the amount of variation
in a step response that might be considered acceptable. Thresholds above 10% resulted
in an inability to discriminate performance as all mutants would either be live or dead.
Columns 5 and 6 in Table 4.8 show the percent live and dead mutants at the 10% threshold.
A summary of our findings are provided in Table 4.8, in the 2nd column is the control
input parameter, the step values of which are given in the 3rd column. In the final column
is the % of dead mutants. At just a 10% threshold output difference all mutants are killed
by the test suite for all control systems except altitude control of the Boeing 747. This
shows the fragility of the control designs which generate different responses with
even just a single, small change to the software. In contrast, only 4.63% of mutants
were killed in the altitude controller of the Boeing 747, suggesting that this controller
is very robust to small software changes. Interestingly, only a few quantities in the
system response were responsible for this dramatic change. For example, in the cruise
control system, only the PeakTime quantity was not within the threshold limit as a result
all the mutants were dead. Similarly, for the helicopter system, only the SettlingMin
quantity was highly impacted by our mutations but caused all the mutants to die. Our
investigation suggests that these two controllers are not robust to software changes and
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the inevitable accompanying evolution. For the Boeing 747, on the other hand, airspeed
was not affected by our mutations at all. Altitude was only mildly affected. This suggests
a controller that is more robust to software changes and maintenance that are part of a
healthy controller evolution. However, control system for airspeed of Boeing 747 was
severely affected and RiseTime played a crucial role.
4.4.2

Analysis II

In this section, we present a more thorough analysis by designing a new oracle to compare
our mutation output results. The analysis in section 4.4.1 is very conservative, in the
sense, our previous oracle classifies a mutant as ”dead” even if one of the step quantities
does not satisfy the threshold criteria of 10% variation in results. Therefore, to better
understand the controller performance, in this second analysis, we made two major
changes in oracle. First, instead of 10% threshold, the oracle now uses a value from 0%
to 100% in the increment of 10. Second, instead of having all 8 step quantities within
the threshold value, the oracle now changes the number of step quantities within the
threshold from 1 to 8 by gradually increasing the number by 1.
The results are presented in Figure 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6,and 4.7. The value present in
each cell of these figures represents the percentage of mutants classified as either live or
dead. On the x-axis, we have the number of step quantities within the threshold criteria.
On the y-axis, we have the threshold criteria; it is given by the range of values from 0-100
denoting the % of error that the step response quantities are allowed to diverge. We begin
our analysis by classifying a mutant as ”live” even if one of the step quantities value is
within the threshold. On the x-axis, we then continue our analysis by gradually increasing
the number of step quantities within the threshold until all the 8 step quantities have to
be within the threshold. Similarly, we repeat this process for different threshold values
from 0% to 100%.
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In addition to this, to show the impact severity on the controller performance, we have
color coded each cells in the figures with green color and red color. Green color denotes
that the mutants are alive, we have different shades of green color (lighter tone to darker
tone) to show the level of impact severity, darker greener means that the system is more
stable or less vulnerable to cyber-physical mismatches. For example, in Figure 4.7(a),
altitude of Boeing 747 is the most robust system as it has more green color shades. On the
other hand, the red color denotes that the mutants are dead, lighter red tone shows less
impact whereas darker red shows critical impact in controller performance. For example,
in Figure 4.6(b), airspeed of Boeing 747 is one of the most unstable system as it has more
darker red color shades.
For the cruise control system, we found that the system was mostly stable and only
one step quantity (i.e., PeakTime) played a major role in not meeting the criteria. The
importance and criticality of this quantity vary depending on the application, but our
analysis shows that a small variant of the system gets affected at a very early stage of
3 step quantity requirement, given by a value greater than zero in Figure 4.3(b). For
helicopter system, both pitch angle and roll angle step response, most of the mutants got
impacted at an early stage, given by a value greater than zero in Figure 4.4(b) and 4.5(b).
Especially in the last 8 step quantity requirement, even though SettlingMin quantity had
a negative value we did not consider this as ”live” because the mutant itself did not have
a valid SettlingTime value. For Boeing 747 system, altitude step response was the most
stable system we observed, as shown in Figure 4.7. On the other hand, the Boeing 747
airspeed quantity was the most unstable system we observed, denoted by more number
of zeros and less values in % live mutants in Figure 4.6(a).
Overall, we observed that our mutation tool can expose the impact in controller
performance. In other words, our generic templates is able to bring out the mismatches
between the control design model and software system, causing the mutants to be unstable.
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It is also interesting to note that if a system has more than one control parameter, like in
the Boeing 747 system, it is not necessary that both parameter has to be impacted at a
same level. This needs to be further investigated in the direction of dependency between
two control parameters in a control system. In control engineering this analysis is called
multiple-input-multiple-output (MIMO) system analysis. In summary, the analysis II
supports the results from the analysis I, it also shows how small divergence can impact
the controller performance with varying threshold criteria.
The key impact of our tool is that much like a change in control gain can be directly
mapped to a change in system response [62], this tool allows us to directly map control
software changes to a change in system response. This opens the door for studying how
to design controllers that lead to robust software implementations.

(a) % Live mutants

(b) % Dead mutants

Figure 4.3: Cruise control system divergence for speed step quantity
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(a) % Live mutants

(b) % Dead mutants

Figure 4.4: Helicopter system divergence for pitch angle step quantity

(a) % Live mutants

(b) % Dead mutants

Figure 4.5: Helicopter system divergence for roll angle step quantity
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(a) % Live mutants

(b) % Dead mutants

Figure 4.6: Boeing747 system divergence for airspeed step quantity

(a) % Live mutants

(b) % Dead mutants

Figure 4.7: Boeing747 system divergence for altitude step quantity
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and Future Work

Modern control systems are complex integrations of computation and physical systems
where software defines the relationship between them. As systems evolve, so do their
controllers and control software though there is little understanding about how control
software evolves. A deeper understanding of the types and quantity of evolution that
occur in controllers can help the control and software communities develop new models
and development strategies to maintain the integrity of key properties verified in the
model and/or software.
We have directly studied the evolution, through 964 commits with 15,066 control
software lines changed, of two dominant open-source control software suites, ArduPilot
and Paparazzi UAV, used extensively in safety-critical unmanned autonomous systems.
We found that control software evolves quickly, with controllers being entirely rewritten
through their lifetime, and introduced categories capturing some of the inherent mismatches between typical control models and control software not previously identified.
To facilitate more rapid study of this evolution we built a mutation tool that can rapidly
change control code and compare its performance against the original designs. The impact of this tool is the ability to map software changes directly to controller performance,
thereby paving the way for studying the design of controllers robust to software changes.
Currently, our approach and tool are still at an early development stage. We could
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incorporate a richer set of templates, including those that attempt to describe resource
attributes category. The tool could also be improved by adding support for different
programming language paradigms. We are also interested in understanding the effect
of mutation changes on the real-time system performance, for example, the scenario
could include a drone flying in a predetermined trajectory. We will be exploring such
improvement and further applying the tool to a larger number of systems.
In addition to this, we acknowledge that control engineers also write software coding
for controllers, we see this trend even at the very early stage as students start taking
courses in control engineering. Once the control engineering students develop control
design model, they implement the model by writing software code in platforms such as
Matlab, Arduino, etc. To help these developers imminently, during the software development process, we are exploring the possibility to automatically warn these developers
if they write codes related to cyber-physical mismatches. We strongly believe that this
could be achieved by creating a plug-in (i.e., plug-in is a software component containing
functions capable of adding specific features) that could be integrated inside the software
developers programming environment to provide a real-time message warning system.
Lastly, from a control engineering perspective, one of the most crucial future directions
is to extend the scope and application of our study. Currently, the scope of our study
is limited to P, PI and PID controller, in the future, we want to include analysis from
other types of controllers such as observer-based control, Fuzzy-logic, etc. From an
application point of view, we also plan to understand the different properties of the
controller. For example, knowing the transfer function of the controller can help us
perform additional mathematical analysis to understand properties like the relationship
between input and output, get a response of the system to any input, and know the poles
and zeros for stability analysis. One possible way forward is to obtain a transfer function
from software code using software abstraction techniques from software engineering
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discipline. Techniques like theorem solver and numerical invariant detection could help
us abstract the transfer function from software code into a mathematical equivalent.
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[3] Karl Johan Åström and B Wittenmark. Computer-controlled systems: theory and design.
Prentice-Hall New York, 1984.
[4] Richard Baker and Ibrahim Habli. An empirical evaluation of mutation testing for
improving the test quality of safety-critical software. IEEE Transactions on Software
Engineering, 39(6):787–805, 2013. 2.2.2
[5] E Bini and G M Buttazzo. The optimal sampling pattern for linear control systems.
Automatic Control, IEEE Transactions on, 59(1):7890, January 2014.
[6] Vı́ctor Braberman, Nicolas D’Ippolito, Nir Piterman, Daniel Sykes, and Sebastian
Uchitel. Controller synthesis: From modelling to enactment. In Proceedings of the 2013
International Conference on Software Engineering, ICSE ’13, pages 1347–1350, Piscataway,
NJ, USA, 2013. IEEE Press. 2.2
[7] Justin M Bradley and Ella M Atkins. Coupled cyber-physical system modeling and
coregulation of a cubesat. IEEE Transactions on Robotics, 31(2):443–456, April 2015.
[8] Giampiero Campa. Airlib, 2018. Accessed: 2018-10-11. 4.2

54
[9] Maria Christakis and Christian Bird. What developers want and need from program
analysis: An empirical study. In Proceedings of the 31st IEEE/ACM International
Conference on Automated Software Engineering, ASE 2016, pages 332–343, New York,
NY, USA, 2016. ACM. 2.1
[10] Darren Cofer and Steven Miller. DO-333 certification case studies. In NASA Formal
Methods Symposium, pages 1–15. Springer, 2014. 2.1
[11] Jamal Daafouz, Pierre Riedinger, and Claude Iung. Stability analysis and control
synthesis for switched systems: A switched Lyapunov function approach. IEEE
transactions on automatic control, 47(11):1883–1887, 2002. 1
[12] Marco D’Ambros, Harald Gall, Michele Lanza, and Martin Pinzger. Analysing
Software Repositories to Understand Software Evolution, pages 37–67. Springer Berlin
Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2008. 2.2.1
[13] Murial Daran and Pascale Thévenod-Fosse. Software error analysis: A real case
study involving real faults and mutations. In ACM SIGSOFT Software Engineering
Notes, volume 21, pages 158–171. ACM, 1996. 2.2.2
[14] Patricia Derler, Edward A Lee, and Alberto Sangiovanni Vincentelli. Modeling
cyber–physical systems. Proceedings of the IEEE, 100(1):13–28, 2012.
[15] RTCA DO. 178b. 1992. Software considerations in airborne systems and equipment
certification. Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA), 1992. 2.2.2
[16] Emad Ebeid, Martin Skriver, and Jie Jin. A survey on open-source flight control
platforms of unmanned aerial vehicle. In Euromicro Symposium on Digital Systems
Design. IEEE, 2017.

55
[17] Sebastian G Elbaum and John C Munson. Code churn: A measure for estimating
the impact of code change. In Software Maintenance, 1998. Proceedings., International
Conference on, pages 24–31. IEEE, 1998.
[18] Tom Erkkinen and Bill Potter. Model-based design for DO-178B with qualified tools.
In AIAA Modeling and Simulation Technologies Conference and Exhibit, 2009. 2.1, 2.2.1
[19] Eric Feron. From control systems to control software. IEEE Control Systems Magazine,
30(6):50–71, December 2010. 2.1, 2.2.1
[20] Eric Feron and Fernando Alegre. Control software analysis, part I open-loop properties. arXiv preprint arXiv:0809.4812, 2008.
[21] Eric Feron and Fernando Alegre. Control software analysis, part II: Closed-loop
analysis. arXiv preprint arXiv:0812.1986, 2008.
[22] Antonio Filieri, Henry Hoffmann, and Martina Maggio. Automated design of selfadaptive software with control-theoretical formal guarantees. In Proceedings of the
36th International Conference on Software Engineering, ICSE 2014, pages 299–310, New
York, NY, USA, 2014. ACM. 2.2
[23] G F Franklin, M L Workman, and D Powell. Digital Control of Dynamic Systems.
Addison-Wesley Longman Publishing Co., Inc. Boston, MA, USA, 1998. 2
[24] Gregory A. Hall and John C. Munson. Software evolution: Code delta and code
churn. Journal of Systems and Software, 54(2):111–118, 2000. 3.2.1
[25] Dan Henriksson, Anton Cervin, and Karl-Erik Årzén. TrueTime: Simulation of
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